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though no such limitation exists under the federal estate tax statute.9
The new statute clears up some ambiguities which existed under the
former provision and clearly specifies that the relationship in both instances must be those specified in the case of class A exemptions.
Like the former statute the new provision does not afford an exemption for property upon which a gift tax has been paid by decedent's
donor within the five-year period prior to the present decedent's death.
The federal law applies the deduction to both types of cases. The avoidance of double taxation within a period of five years is the reason for
allowing the exemption for property previously taxed. Whether the
previous tax is imposed under the state inheritance tax statute or under
the state gift tax statute would seem to be immaterial. Here, again,
there seems to be no substantial reason for failing to follow the pattern
of the federal estate tax law.
ALFRED HARSH
OThe difference in this respect between state and federal laws stems from the fact
that the state imposes a classified inheritance tax whereas the federal tax is an estate
tax levied without reference to the relationship between the decedent and those who
take from him.

TORTS
Survival of Actions-Death of Tort-Feasor. This Act represents
a long overdue attempt to reform a particularly barbarous segment of
the law by providing for the survival of causes of action for bodily injuries, property damage, or wrongful death against the deceased tort
feasor. It is not entirely clear that it will succeed; in 1869 a statute was
passed saying that "all causes of action.., by one person against another, whether arising on contract or otherwise, survive to the personal
representative of the former and against the personal representative
of the latter." One would suppose that nothing could be clearer-that
the legislature could have done nothing more than to add the phrase
"and we mean it"--but by that strange alchemy which courts occasionally practice the statute was transmuted to read "all causes of action which survive at common law.., survive,"' thereby furnishing
as neat an example of judicial legislation as can readily be brought to
mind. Nor was it in a good cause, or for justifiable ends; the origin and
limits of the common law scheme of survival are not only wrapped in
I2 RCW 420.040 ERRS §9671.

Slauson v. Schwabacher Bros., 4 Wash. 783, 31 Pac. 329 (1892).
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mystery, but its results have been outrageous in terms of justice.' Reliance in support of it has always been placed on the maxim actw personalis moritur cum persona. This has a rolling sonority which is impressive, and in the days, fortunately passing,' when a Latin quotation
was thought to ornament an opinion, might add a note of scholarship,
the difficulty lies in the fact that it means nothing, since the word
"Personalis" has no definite content at all. ' Similar more current examples-the phrase res inter alios acta and the expression res gestaeare other illustrations of the squid-like process by which courts, having
released an obscuring cloud of Latin, can scuttle to safety and take up
the next point in the opinion secure from pursuit.
This time hope for judicial approval of the statute is bright, if only
because the great majority of the states now go even farther than the
present Act in permitting survival.' Six states in fact permit all causes
to survive the death of either or both parties, though in some there are
certain specified exceptions such as breach of marriage promise,
slander, assault, and so on.
Several points may be made in connection with the Act before its
proviso is considered. The first may seem over-meticulous, but it is
certainly better to draft a statute affirmatively rather than negatively
. shall survive," rather than "no
-to say, "all claims for damages
claims for damages . shall abate."
Secondly, the statute leaves entirely to speculation the question of
the collection of the judgment on the surviving (or perhaps one should
say non-abating) cause of action, and this is running something of a
risk in a community property state. The decedent's separate property
is clearly subject to levy, and his indemnity insurer will have to pay;
if there is no separate property, or no insurance, or if either or both are
inadequate, will the judgment run only against decedent's share of the
community property, or against all of it? Building on Bortle v. Osborneit is possible to make a convincing argument that all of the
property is subject to the claim-indeed any other result might go far
3 LAw REvisioN CommissioN, STATE OF N.Y. 159-229 (1935), an elaborate study
of the entire problem of the survival of tort causes of action. See also similar reports
for 1935, pp. 87-122, and 1942, pp. 21-25. The New York act on survival of tort actions would seem to be a model.
4 But it is not quite gone, see Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 592, 285 Pac. 425
(1930).
5 For example, contract actions almost universally survive; are they any less "actio
personalis" than tort claims?

6 See note 3 supra.
7 Supra note 4.
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toward taking away the benefit of the statutory survival-but it would
seem a matter -best taken care of in the statute itself.
Thirdly, there is a point on which the statute should be promptly
amended: in its present form it does not touch the wrongful death case
in which the tort feasor predeceases plaintiff's decedent. Since no claim
has arisen during the lifetime of the tort feasor,8 obviously there is none
to survive his death, and the benefit of the statute is lost by a perfectly'
fortuitous circumstance-a result supportable neither in reason nor
justice. Provision should also be made for the simultaneous death of
of the parties, or, what is in essence the same thing, for cases in which
it is impossible to determine from the evidence which survived the
other.
The proviso of the statute fixes the quantum or at least the source of
the proof necessary to warrant a recovery: "Provided, however, that
the plaintiff shall not recover judgment except upon competent evidence other than the testimony of said injured person or persons and
the testimony of the injured person or persons, by itself, shall not be
sufficient to overcome the presumption of due care on the part of the
deceased tort feasor." This creates a new presumption on the lines of
that anomaly," the presumption of freedom from contributoryfault on
the part of plaintiff's decedent; it is one which has no backing in probability and would certainly be as baffling to handle in jury cases as the
other, and for the same reason: the burden of proof on the issue is
already fixed in any event. Fortunately confusion is likely resolved
before it has been raised by Hutton v. Martin," holding that it was not
only unnecessary but in fact prejudicial error to instruct the jury on
the presumption of lack of contributory negligence, since the whole matter is taken care of by the normal instruction on the burden of proof.
It is difficult to conceive of any reason for not handling the statutory
presumption in the same common-sense manner.
The requirement of proof by competent evidence other than that of
the injured person seems unfortunate, if only because it runs counter
to the trend from that anachronism, the "interested witness" rule. It
is not so bad as it might be; the statute does not in terms mention the
"interested witness" nor disqualify him from testifying. But "injured
sThe action accrues at the death of plaintiff's decedent. Grant v. Fisher Flouring
Mills, 181 Wash. 576, 44 P2d 193 (1935).
9Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WAsH. L. R1y. 71 (1940).
10 41 Wn.2d 780, 252 P2d 581 (1953). Cf. Smith v. Yamashita, 142 Wash. Dec. 446,
256 P.2d 281 (1953), where apparently the plaintiff still has the "benefit" of the presumption of due care, though no one can mention it under the rule of the Hutton case.
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person or persons" and "interested witness" will be in fact just about
the same thing and there is a quasi-disqualification in the statement
that such testimony, "by itself," shall not be enough to satisfy the burden of proof on negligence, even assuming the court's subsumption of
the statutory presumption in the burden of proof. Moreover it leaves
the whole matter at loose ends, which is always frightening to one
charged with concocting instructions. How much additional evidence is
required? What ksnd of additional evidence? What should the jury be
told about it, if anything? When can a mandatory instruction be given
for the plaintiff? It must be remembered that the plaintiff must still
runs the gantlet of the Deadman's Act," and here he is put to the additional hazard of producing uninjured witnesses-the whole process
demonstrating a somewhat alarming distrust of our normal methods of
trial. If our judges and juries cannot cope intelligently with party testimony, we are in dire straits indeed.
JoHN W RicHARDs

11

RCW 5.60.030 ERRS § 1211].

